The legal theories of Amy Coney Barrett, explained - 2020-09-24
According to multiple news sources, President Trump is set to announce that his nominee to replace Ruth Bader Ginsburg on the Supreme Court is Judge Amy Coney Barrett, who sits on the US Court of the Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (based in Chicago) and is also a law professor at Notre Dame.
The 48-year-old Barrett was appointed by Trump to the appeals court in 2017, and was also reportedly a finalist for Justice Anthony Kennedy's seat in 2018. She has been portrayed as a favorite of social conservatives seeking to push against the Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence. She is unusual, compared especially to famously (and perhaps strategically) tight-lipped recent nominees like Brett Kavanaugh and Elena Kagan, for her extensive paper trail on questions of constitutional law. As a legal academic, she's written extensively on what obedience to the original meaning of the Constitution requires of judges and members of Congress; how to reconcile the importance of precedent with allegiance to the Constitution's original meaning; and how precedent can be used to mediate deep disagreements about the law.
As a result, we know more about her jurisprudential beliefs than we'll know about those of any SCOTUS nominee since, perhaps, Ginsburg. We know she identifies as an originalist who believes that the original public meaning of the Constitution is binding law. But we also know that she is skeptical of the radical libertarian originalist idea that economic regulation is presumptively unconstitutional, and that she believes some Supreme Court decisions that originalists may conclude are incorrectly decided nonetheless stand as "superprecedents" that the Court can abide by.